Executable software security system

ABSTRACT

A computer system which is configured to load executable programs. This configuration first accepts an operator defined key; withdraws an encrypted executable program from memory; and, using the operator defined key, decrypts the encrypted executable program into a functional executable program. It is this functional executable program which is used by the processing unit. During shutdown, each executable program is checked to see if it was derived from an encrypted executable program; those that aren&#39;t, are verified as being legitimate by the operator prior to their storage into the memory.

This is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No.11/170,229, filed on Jun. 28, 2005, and entitled, “EncryptedCommunications”.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates generally to the communication of data and moreparticularly to communications which are encrypted.

While distributed network systems such as the Internet, have expandedthe horizons for the world in the collection and dissemination ofknowledge, by the very nature of these systems, there has developed agrowing awareness that information which is so easily obtained, is alsolost with the same ease. The problems and crimes associated with thebroad dissemination of information have become common place occurrences,and the problems are only expected to become more pronounce in thefuture.

These problems include such things as: identity theft; credit cardtheft; hacking into private data-bases; disrupting private computersthrough “viruses”; disruption of governmental data bases; fraudulentcontrol of traffic systems; and many more.

Central to all of these problems is the intrinsic anonymous nature ofthe communications. A receiver of information receives only bits/bytesof digital information and the source of such digital information isgenerally unknown. Within the Internet, identities are easily created.

In an attempt to provide some level of knowledge of the other side,passwords and ID's (identification values/symbols) are often used.Unfortunately, often these passwords/IDs are stolen and are then usedindiscriminately by a criminal or hacker.

Another technique which has been used to curtail the improper gathers ofinformation is the creation of encryption techniques such as the iKPprotocol. These protection schemes though attempt to develop a standardencryption methodology which is used for every secure transmission, butthis requirement in and of itself tends to make the encryption bothdifficult in use and in storing.

Almost by the very nature of encryption, encryption must be complex. TheEnigma Machine developed by Germany during World War II was an elaborateand complex systems of gears which was used to map each new characterand which relied upon the previously mapped message in determining howthe next character was mapped.

While there is a natural tendency to use “complex” solutions, thesecomplexities make the use of the solution difficult if not impossible.

Another problem which computer users have encountered is theunauthorized planting of viruses , “spyware”, and other programs into ausers computer. These unauthorized programs often enter the computerinnocuously during normal operation of the computer and are then storedinto the computer's memory automatically during normal shut-down of thecomputer.

If left unchecked, these unauthorized programs can cripple a computer;and in some situations, sensitive data is stolen without the user everbeing aware of the theft.

It is clear there is a need for an efficient protection from theunauthorized use of an individual's computer.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A communications system in which a sending computer encrypts a messageusing a key associated with the computer which is to receive themessage; the receiving computer uses a key associated with the sendingcomputer in the decryption process.

In the preferred embodiment, the sending computer is equipped with a setof keys and each key within the set is useable for the encryptionprocess. The selection of a particular key depends on the destination ofthe message; or, if it is the first time a message is being sent to thatdestination, the key is arbitrarily selected and a record associated thearbitrarily selected key and the destination is made for futurereference.

While the present discussion refers to “computer”, the invention is notintended to apply solely to a single or stand-alone computer. Rather,the term “computer” is intended to relate to a single computer as wellas a system of computers which work in concert to obtain the objectivesoutlined.

The following discussion recognizes that a computer is configured toperform a designated operation on data to obtain a desired result.Configuration of a computer is often done through a programming language(e.g. assembly, basic, Colbol, Fortran, C.) which defines the functionof the computer; but, in some situations, “hard wired” or dedicatedcircuitry is also used.

Within the present discussion, the invention relates to a sequence ofsymbols which are represented in a digital manner. Those of ordinaryskill in the art readily recognize a variety of such sequences such asthe American Standard Code for information Interchange (ASCII). In somesituations, the digital map to symbols is arbitrarily done. In thiscase, each symbol is arbitrarily assigned a unique value which formsanother level of encryption.

The present discussion refers to the Internet, but, the invention is notintended to be so limited and is viable for any distributed network ofcomputers.

For ease in reference, some many of the terms used herein, such as“computers”, “keys”, “data”, “messages” and the like, have been givenlabels (such as first, second third or primary, secondary, etc.) to helpidentify them; but, these labels are not intended to be limiting as tothe order of use, ownership, or physical position.

Within this invention, each “computer” is defined by its capabilities orfunction.

Within the present invention, each digital value which is to becommunicated, is mapped uniquely to another value within the field. Inthis manner, the mapping or encrypting is done on an individual valuewithout any necessary reference to prior or future encryptions. Toaccomplish this unique mapping objective, the encrypting site and thedecrypting site both have a “key” which is used both for the encryptingand decrypting operation. Since the “key” or mapping template provides aunique mapping and that “key” is not available to others, thepossibility of a “hacker” being able to fraudulently decrypt the messageis all but eliminated.

In this context, the “key” is a series of values which are used in boththe mapping process and the reverse-mapping process and consists of aseries S_(j).

The creation of the key is accomplished through a variety techniques,including, but not limited to: random number generation, prior databased, fixed set, historically based, based on the computeridentification/serial number, or any combination of the above.

Random number based keys are created using a programmed or “canned”random number generator. These generators produce a series of valueswhich appear random, but, in actuality are not truly random in that eachtime the random number generator program is initiated, it produces anidentical series of “random numbers”; hence, if the encrypting and thedecrypting computers operate the same random number generator, bothcomputers develop identical series of values.

An alternative technique creates a series of numbers to create the keyusing values from the message or the key itself which have been producedor provided earlier. In this case, a Markov type of series is produced.The creation of the function which produces this series of values islimitless and relies only upon the creative power of the developer. Asexample, the following are all possible functions:S _(j)=3*S _(j−1)+2*S _(j−2) +S _(j−3) ORS _(j)=3*O _(j−1)+2*O _(j−2) +O _(j−3)S _(j) =Abs(3*S _(j−1)−(S _(j−2) +S _(j−3))²)S _(j) =Abs(3*O _(j−1)−(O _(j−2) +O _(j−3))²)S _(j) =S _(j−1) +S _(j−2) +S _(j−3)S _(j) =O _(j−1) +O _(j−2) +O _(j−3)S _(j) =S _(j−1)+2S _(j) =O _(j−1)+2S _(j)=2*S _(j−2)+5S _(j)=2*O _(j−2)+5

(Note, within this discussion, “*” denotes multiplication; “ABS” denotesabsolute value)

A fixed set is any sequence of values. Ideally these values should nothave any readily discernable relationship or patter, making hacking themessage even more difficult. When a fixed set is used, both theencrypting and the decrypting computer ideally have the fixed set withintheir own memory. Again, the number of sets which can be used are onlylimited by the creativity of the developer of such sets. Examples ofsuch sets include:

Set 1 3, 6, 9, 32, 55, 43, 29, 23, 5, 13, 19, 91, 28, 21, 23, 11, 19,100, 43, 56, 59, 132, 255, 1143, 2329, 623, 65, 613, 919, 91, 128, 421,823, 711, 19, 0

Set 2 2, 4, 7, 4, 9, 3, 6, 1, 9, 6, 6, 8, 5, 4

Note, the length of the fixed set isn't critical to the process as theset can be extended to any required length (to fit the message itself)by simply repeating the fixed set, reversing its order, skipping valueswhen repeating the set, etc. Those of ordinary skill in the art readilyrecognize a variety of different techniques which allow the fixed set'slength to be extended.

Also note, the values within the key are not limited to a particularrange; although some embodiments do limit the values to a set range forease in computation.

A “key” is possible using historical data. In this method, each newmessage is used to establish a new “key”. As example, if the messagewas, “The red dog ran home”, then these values will be used as the keyfor the second message; and the second message will act as a “key” forthe third message; etc.

A “key” can also be made using the computer's own identification. Suchfixed values include the serial numbers of the computers involved and/orthe e-mail identifier for the computers. Those of ordinary skill in theart readily recognize a variety of techniques which serve this function.As example, assume the computer's serial number is: AJX45812, then apotential initial key is (assigning numerical values to the letters)

-   -   27 36 40 4 5 5 8 1 2        with a subsequent set being defined as the value in the first        set added to the next occurring value:    -   63 76 44 9 13 9 29        This technique can be repeated as many times as is necessary to        provide mapping values for the length of the message being        received.

Even further, some “keys” are created using combinations of the above.

For purposes of description, the following are used as the mathematicalbasis for the preferred embodiment of the invention.

-   -   N denotes the number of symbols or characters within the        communication;    -   O_(j) denotes the original value for the Jth position in the        message, J=1, N;    -   MSG denotes the communication produced by the series O_(j), J=1,        N;    -   S_(j) denotes the adjustment value for the Jth position in the        message, J=1, N;    -   K The key sequence denoted by the series S_(j), J=1, N;    -   E_(j) denotes the encrypted value for the Jth position in the        message, J=1, N; While the preferred embodiment place a range        for E_(j) to fall within the range of O_(j), other embodiments        do not have this requirement;    -   M(A,B) denotes the mapping function E_(j)=M(O_(j), S_(j)), J=1,        N, where M is the function that maps the original value O_(j)        using an adjustment value S_(j) to get the encrypted value        E_(j);    -   M′(A,B) denotes a converse map O_(j)=M′(E_(j), S_(j)), J=1, N        which maps the encrypted valued E_(j), using the adjustment        value S_(j) to recreate the original message O_(j);    -   X_(j) denotes the maximum numerical value for O_(j); (often this        value is fixed for the entire message but in some situations,        the maximum value changes during the message);    -   R(A,B) This function returns the whole number remainder value        when A is divided by B (this function is used within the        preferred embodiment for the mapping operation).

Using the above references, the preferred embodiment uses a mappingfunction as indicated:E _(j) =M(O _(j) , S _(j))=R[O _(j) +R(S _(j) , X _(j)), X _(j)]

Those of ordinary skill in the art readily recognize a variety of otherrelationships which serve as mapping using the above structures.Examples of these types of mapping are:E _(j) =M(O _(j) , S _(j))=R[O _(j) *S _(j) , X _(j)]E _(j) =M(O _(j) , S _(j))=R[O _(j)+2*S ₃ , X _(j)]E _(j) =M(O _(j) , S _(j))=R[O _(j) +S _(j) +S _(j) , X _(j)]

Further, those of ordinary skill in the art readily recognizealternative mapping functions that are useablc in the context describedherein.

The invention, to protect a computer from unauthorized programs, has aninterface which is configured to load executable programs; theseprograms are stored in an encrypted form. The interface allows for thewithdrawal of and storage of executable programs from a memory mechanismwhere the executable programs are kept in encrypted form.

During operation, the interface component of the computer system acceptsan operator. defined key. This key is used for both the encryption anddecryption as outlined above. In the preferred embodiment, the key iscollected from the operator. This assures the operator that only he isable to load executable programs onto his computer. Without the properkey, the program will not be decrypted properly and will only be“garbage” and not be able to program the computer.

Note, this embodiment of the invention allows multiple users the abilityto use a single computer/computer system without having to shareexecutable programs. Each user is able to decrypt only their ownsoftware and retrieve that software using their individual key. In thismanner, a large computer system operator is assured that only those thathave authority to use a particular program (due to licensingrestrictions, security classification, or privacy issues) is providedaccess to the program.

The encrypted executable program from memory. Using the operator definedkey, the interface decrypts the encrypted executable program into afunctional executable program and places the functional executableprogram into the processing unit or its associated working memory.

It is this functional executable program which is used by the processingunit to direct its operation.

During shutdown of the computer, each executable program is checked tosee if it was derived from an encrypted executable program; those thataren't, are verified as being legitimate by the operator prior to theirstorage into the memory.

In one embodiment, to accomplish the verification, a query is presentedto the operator asking if the program should be properly stored (i.e.encrypted before being placed in memory). If the operator consents, theprogram is considered “authorized” and is encrypted and stored; if theoperator does not consent, then the program is “trashed”.

Note, if a “hacker” were to simply place the unauthorized executableprogram in memory, little or no damage is done. When the computer startsup again and attempts to withdraw the unauthorized program from memory,during the decrypting process, the unauthorized program is scrambledinto “garbage”. Little inducement is given for the backer to attempt toplant a worm, spyware, cookie, or “pop-up” program.

A further advantage of the present invention is its ability to check a“key” without having the key accessible to anyone. To accomplish this,the presented key is used to decrypt an encrypted template from thememory into a decrypted template.

The now decrypted template is used as a verifying mechanism to see ifthe key entered by the operator was properly given or might have beenmistyped.

Verifying the decrypted template may be as simple as asking theoperator, “Is your name . . . ” where the decrypted template is used asthe name. Other techniques for verifying the template include a simplecheck to a unencrypted template or a check to see if the unencryptedtemplate matches the operator provided key. Those of ordinary skill inthe art readily recognize a variety of other uses employing thedecrypted template.

This technique for checking the key provides a fail-safe method toassure the operator hasn't mis-typed the key before the key is used inthe encryption and decryption process.

The invention, together with various embodiments thereof, will be morefully explained by the accompanying drawings and the followingdescriptions thereof.

DRAWINGS IN BRIEF

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the preferred embodiment of the mail serversystem.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the audio/video/program download system ofthe present invention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating secure communications betweenmultiple users.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the invention used toprovide security for a data base.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the use of differing encryptionsystems between a sender and a receiver.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the preferred embodiment for the creationof secure usage of a software program.

FIG. 7 is a flow-chart illustrating an embodiment of the remaindersubroutine used in the preferred encryption technique.

FIG. 8 is a flow-chart illustrating the preferred embodiment for theencryption technique.

FIG. 9 is a flow-chart illustrating the preferred embodiment of thedecryption technique.

FIGS. 10A and 10B are flow-charts illustrating an embodiment of theaudio/video/program download and play-back respectively.

FIGS. 11A and 11B are flow-charts of the preferred embodiment'soperation for mail for when a message is to be sent and when a messageis received.

FIG. 12 is a table illustrating the preferred embodiment's process.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating the invention's protection forexecutable programs.

FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating the preferred embodiment for theverification of a proper key.

FIGS. 15A, 15B, and 15C illustrate alternatives for the verification ofkey input.

FIG. 16 is a flowchart of the preferred embodiment of the interface usedto withdraw encrypted executable programs.

FIG. 17 is a flowchart of the preferred embodiment of the interface usedto store/encrypt executable programs.

DRAWINGS IN DETAIL

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the preferred embodiment of the mail serversystem embodiment of the invention.

Mail server computer 14 is accessible to multiple computers via theInternet 13. For this illustration, three computers are used. Computers10, 11, and 12, are connected to the Internet 13 and by extension, alsoto mail server 14.

Two different types of operations are possible with this configuration:

-   -   (1) one computer wants to communicate with another in a secure        manner, but, the two have not done so previously; and,    -   (2) two computers wish to securely communicate with each other        and have done so previously.

Addressing the first scenario, computer 10 is equipped with theencryption software (M) and a set of keys as defined above (in analternative embodiment, computer 10 is configured to establish the keyusing one of the techniques above); but, computer 11 does not have thedecryption software (M′) nor any keys.

The user of computer 10 enters a communication, MSG and a destinationaddress (i.e. the e-mail address for computer 11 (or some otheridentifier). Computer 14 determines that this destination has not beenused before so one of the keys from the set of keys is arbitrarilyselected. Using this key and the mapping function, M. The communicationMSG is encrypted.

The now-encrypted communication, an identifier of the key used, and thedestination address, are communicated to the mail server computer 14 bycomputer 10 via Internet 13.

Mail server computer 14 recognizes that computer 10 has not previouslycommunicated securely with computer 11. Using the destinationinformation, computer 14 sends an unencrypted message to computer 11 andprovides computer 11 with the capability to download the decryptionfunction/software M′ together with a single key which is to be used todecrypt the encrypted communication.

In this manner, computer 11 is provided with the capability to receivesecure communications from computer 10; but, computer 11 is not able tosend secure communications back to computer 10 (nor to any othercomputers) without acquiring the encryption mapping capability Mtogether with the entire set of keys.

In the second scenario, the case where two computers have alreadyestablished a relationship, computer 10 is equipped with the encryptionsoftware (M) and computer 12 has the decryption software (M′) togetherwith a set of keys.

The user of computer 10 enters a communication, MSG and a destinationaddress (i.e. the e-mail address for computer 12 or other identifier).Using the destination address (an identification of computer 12),computer 10 identifies a specific key within the set of keys and usesthe specific key with the mapping function M on the communication MSG tocreate the encrypted message.

The encrypted message is communicated from computer 10 via the Internet13 to mail server computer 14. Mail server computer 14, knowing thesource of the now-encrypted communication, as well as the destinationaddress (computer 12), determines that these two computers have been inprevious secure communications; hence, mail server computer 14 passesthe communication along to computer 12.

In an alternative embodiment, mail server computer 14 decrypts themessage from computer 10 and re-encrypts the message specifically forcomputer 12. This embodiment provides another level of security.

In yet another embodiment, mail server computer 14 either directly orinstructs computer 10 to modify its memory so that the next time asecure communication is sent from computer 10 to computer 12, adifferent key is used. This modification provides additional securityrelative to the communications.

Upon receipt of the encrypted message, computer 12, using the sourceidentifier of computer 10, identifies the proper key from its memorywhich is to be used in the decryption process. This identified key,together with the decryption mapping function M′, allows computer 12 torecreate the original message and display (or place in memory) theoriginal message for the user of computer 12.

Computer 12 is also able to send a secure communication to computer 10in a manner as outlined above for a communication between computer 10and computer 12.

Note, ideally, the entire encryption/decryption process is “transparent”to the users of computer 11 and computer 12. That is, the users only“see” decrypted material and all encryption and decryption is doneautomatically.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the audio/video/program download system ofthe present invention.

In this situation, the security which is sought isn't against a thirdparty interloper, but, instead is from the user of computer 22 who,while authorized to obtain the data, may want to download data and thenimproperly share the downloaded data with others who have not paid orwho are not authorized to have the downloaded data.

Download server 21 interacts with remote computers via Internet 20.Download server 21 contains digital data which is used to create music,audio, and/or video representations.

When computer 22 wants to acquire such data, contact is made by computer22 which requests a specific set of data from download server 21. Duringthe request, computer 22 communicates a key specific to computer 22which is to be used for the encryption and decryption of the data set.This key is ideally an internally stored value or sequence.

Using the key for computer 22 and the data, download server 21 encryptsthe data and communicates the encrypted data via Internet 20 to computer22 which stores the encrypted data in memory. While in some embodiments,the data is decrypted prior to storage, in the preferred embodiment ofthis system, the encrypted data set is stored in memory and is notdecrypted until ready for use.

During use of the encrypted data set by computer 22, portions of theencrypted data set are withdrawn from the memory and are decrypted. Thisdecryption step is accomplished using the internally established keywithin computer 22; thereby making decryption by any other machineimpossible since decryption requires the unique key uniquely foundwithin computer 22.

To further enhance the security of the downloaded material, ideally,only a portion of the encrypted data set is ever withdrawn anddecrypted; without the data ever being fully decrypted, the data is notvaluable or usable by any other device except computer 22.

In like fashion, handheld computer 22 is able to interact with downloadserver 21 via Internet 20 and obtain data which, when used by handheldcomputer 22 produces music, audio information, or movies.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the secure communications betweenmultiple users.

In this embodiment, a mail server is not employed, rather, traditionale-mail communications systems are used for the delivery of the messages.Each computer (31, 32, and 33) is able to send messages which have adestination as well as a message (with or without attachments).

In this embodiment, when a user of computer 31 wants to send a securetransmission to a remote computer 33. Computer 31, by knowing thedestination, is able to use the appropriate key to encrypt the messageand any attachments for computer 33. On receiving the message, sincecomputer 33 knows the source of the message, computer 33 knows theproper key to use in decrypting the message.

When the user of computer 31 wants to send a secure message to computer32, a different key is chosen. Computer 31 is creating a series ofcommunications with any number of remote computers, but, each remotecomputer receives the message in its own unique “language” which is notdiscernable by the other remote computers. In this manner, uniquecommunications are available. Note, in some situations, a particular keyis used with many different computers; but, the selection of the key isstill based on the destination computer.

Should computer 33 receives a message purportedly from computer 31, whenthe message is decrypted, if the resulting message is gibberish, thencomputer 33 knows that the message did not originate from computer 31(since the “language” did not match); conversely, if the message makessense, then the user of computer 33 is assured of the true source of themessage.

This technique prevents hackers from assuming a false identity merely togain access to a computer.

To further enhance this security shield, in one embodiment, a portion ofthe message being communicated contains an encrypted key which is to beused for the next transmission or reply. This makes it even moredifficult for the hacker to counterfeit his identity from the receivingcomputer. As example, the tenth characters is used as a source in thegeneration of random numbers by a canned random number generator.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the invention used toprovide security for a data base. This embodiment of the inventionprovides security for a data base which is accessed by many remotesites. Data-base access operations are commonly found in such businessesas: credit card companies; state motor vehicle departments; internalrevenue; banking facilities; and many more obvious to those of ordinaryskill in the art.

This embodiment prevents an authorized user of the data base fromimproperly collecting data from the data base for nefarious uses.

In this embodiment, data base 45 contains a large amount of proprietaryinformation which is accessible by remote computers 41, 42, and 43. Thematerial within data base 45 is encrypted and remains-encrypted usingany of the techniques already discussed or others obvious to thoseordinary skill in the art.

When the operator of computer 41 seeks a certain data set, such as thatfor a particular customer, the inquiry is sent to controllerdecryption/encryption 44 which identifies the particular data set withindata base 45 (which is encrypted) and requests that encryptedinformation to be sent by data-base 45 tocontroller/decryption/encryption 44.

Controller decryption/encryption 44, in the preferred embodiment,decrypts the data set from its stored encrypted state and thenre-encrypts the data set using a key which is specific to computer 41.When the secondly encrypted data set is received by computer 41,computer 41 decrypts the data set for use by the user of computer 41.

The user of computer 41 is able to manipulate the data set as per theirjob (such as changing certain elements to reflect such things as anincreased loan amount). To store the up-dated data set, computer 41encrypts the up-dated data set and communicates the encrypted materialback to controller 44.

Controller 44, upon receiving the encrypted data set, recognizes thesource of the material and, using the key appropriate for computer 41,decrypts the data set and then re-encrypts the data set commensuratewith the encryption technique and key used for data storage within database 45.

In this manner, the user of computer 41 is only able to acquire alimited amount of data, as the contents of the data base are keptencrypted using a key which is unknown to the user of computer 41.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the use of differing encryptionsystems between a sender and a receiver.

As noted earlier, communication between two computers requires that eachof the computers is able to identify the source of the information andthe address where information is to be sent. This is true whether thetransmission is considered an e-mail or an instant message.

As such, computer 51 and computer 52, when communicating with each othervia Internet 50, identity themselves and each other with each of themessages being sent. While some embodiments of the invention utilize thesame key for the encryption for the outgoing messages (which is alsoused for the decryption process), in the preferred embodiment each ofthe computers 51 and 52 use a unique key for the reply message. Thiscauses message 53A to be encrypted differently than message 53B, eventhough the same two computers are being used for both messages.

This structure keeps someone from being able to re-create the entire“conversation” between computers 5I and 52 without knowing bothencryption keys.

This technique is also extremely useful for identifying if the source ofthe message is who they claim to be, as a hacker will be unable toproperly encrypt a message; hence, when the improperly encrypted messageis decrypted, “garbage” is created.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the preferred embodiment for the creationof secure usage of a software program to prevent the pirating ofsoftware.

For explanation of this figure, a software program (such as a spreadsheet program) has been stored in the long term memory 63 of thecomputer. The program within long term memory 63 is encrypted using anidentifier (such as the serial number) of the computer as the key forthe encryption.

When the program is to be operated, Central Processing Unit (CPU) 60directs a portion of the program 64A to be withdrawn and decrypted 61.The decrypted portion is communicated to the volatile or working memory(e.g. Random Access Memory RAM, or the like) 62 which is used by CPU 60in performing the program segment.

When further portions of the program within long term memory 63 areneeded, these sections are selectively pulled 64B and 64C, decrypted 61,and used to refresh or replace the contents of RAM 62.

At no time is the entirety of the program within long term memory 63fully decrypted; rather, only portions of the program are accessible ina decrypted form and hence only a portion of the program is everavailable to be “pirated”.

FIG. 7 is a flow-chart illustrating an embodiment of the remaindersubroutine used in the preferred encryption technique.

This encryption technique uses a remainder operation in the mappingoperations, whether that operation is for encryption or decryption. Inthis embodiment, the remainder subroutine (R(A,B)) receives the values Aand B and returns C, the whole number remainder when A is divided by B.

After the subroutine begins 70A, a pointer is set to zero 71A and thevalues A and B are obtained 72. A decision is then made if A<B 73A andif so, C is assigned the value A 71B and the subroutine returns C 70B.

If the check of A<B 73A is no, then the pointer is incremented 71C and adetermination is made on if the product of P*A>B is made 73B. If thedetermination is no, then the pointer is incremented again 71C and theprocess continues until P*A>B (Yes 73B); C is assigned the value ofB−(P−I)*A 71D and the program returns the value C 70B.

In this manner, the remainder value is established.

FIG. 8 is a flow-chart illustrating the preferred embodiment for theencryption technique. The mapping function for this encryption is (usingthe references of above):E _(j) =R[O _(j) +R(S _(j) , X _(j)), X _(j) ] J=1, N

Once the program starts 80A, a determination is made to see if the Endof File (EOF) 85 has occurred. An EOF indicates that the entire messagehas been read. If there has been an EOF, then the program stops 80B;otherwise, the adjustment value from the key (S_(j)), the maximum numberof potential characters (X_(j)) and the original symbol (O_(j)) arcobtained 81.

The remainder is obtained (R[O_(j), X_(j)]) 82A and the value C isreturned. The remainder is obtained for (R[O_(j)+C, X_(j)]) 82B and C isreturned. The encrypted value E_(j) is assigned the value C and theE_(j) is then displayed. communicated, or stored 84. The program thenreturns to check for the EOF 85.

In this manner, the entire message is encrypted, symbol by symbol usinga key for the mapping/encryption process.

FIG. 9 is a flow-chart illustrating the preferred embodiment of thedecryption technique.

As noted earlier, ideally the decryption process is performedautomatically without any human initiation. In the preferred embodimentof the encryption, the program outlined in FIG. 9 is initiatedautomatically upon the receipt or opening of an e-mail, instant message,or any other type of message.

Once the program starts 90A, a determination is made on if an End OfFile (EOF) has occurred 91A. An EOF indicates that the entire messagehas been decrypted; hence, on EOF, the program stops 90B.

If there hasn't been an EOF, then the encrypted letter E_(j) is obtained92A followed by the adjustment value S_(j) and the maximum level X_(j)92B. The remainder subroutine is initiated on S_(j) and X_(j) 93returning the value C.

A comparison is then made to determine if C is less than the encryptedletter E_(j) 91B. If C<E_(j), then the original letter O_(j), is E_(j)−C94A; otherwise, the original letter O_(j) is E_(j)+C−X_(j) 94B.

With the determination of the original letter O_(j), the original letterO_(j) is displayed (or stored) 95 and the program returns to see if anEOF has now occurred 91A.

In this manner, the entire encrypted message is decrypted letter byletter using the adjustment values as the key and the maximum value toassist in the mapping procedure.

FIGS. 10A and 10B are flow-charts illustrating an embodiment of theaudio/video/program download and play-back respectively.

Referencing FIG. 10A, the download component, once the program starts100A, the computer's identification (i.e. the serial number) istransmitted to the source 101 (where the data is being downloaded from).The source then transmits the encrypted series E_(j) 102A which is thenstored within the computer's memory 103A. The program then stops 100B.

When the encrypted series E_(j) is to be played (FIG. 10B), the programstarts 100C and an particular value E_(j) is pulled from memory 102B andthis value is decrypted resulting in the decrypted value, the originalcharacter/value O_(j) 104. The original character/value O_(j) is played103B.

An EOF check 105 is made. If the EOF has been encountered, then theprogram stops 100D; otherwise the program loops back and pulls anotherencrypted value 102B.

FIGS. 11A and 11B are flow-charts of the preferred embodiment'soperation for mail for when a message is to be sent and when a messageis received.

A computer, when sending a message (FIG. 11A) starts the program 110Aand obtains the destination and message 111A. Using the destination, akey value is determined 112A and the message is encrypted 113A. Theencrypted message is then transmitted through normal channels or via amail server to the destination 112B and the program stops 110B.

An incoming encrypted message is preferably handled as shown in FIG.11B. The program starts 110C and the source of the message and theencrypted message is obtained 111B. Using the source information, theassociated key for decryption is identified 112C and the encryptedmessage is decrypted 113B. The now-decrypted message is displayed forthe user 114 and the program stops 110D.

FIG. 12 is a table illustrating the preferred encryption and decryptionprocess.

Using the preferred mapping function (E_(j)=M(O_(j),S_(j))=R[O_(j)+R(S_(j), X_(j)), X_(j)]), FIG. 12 illustrates how themessage: “the red dog ran home” 120 is first encrypted and thendecrypted.

For this example, the numerical values range from 0=blank space, 1=“a”,2=“b” . . . 25=“y”, and X_(j) is a constant value 26.

In this example, the key S_(j), 121 which is used is defined by theseries:

-   -   4 20 6 21 22 39 27 48 4 14 32 7 81 0 17 17 14 42 8 4

As illustrated, the receiving computer (doing the decryption) uses areversing algorithm together with the key set S_(j), which were alsoused in the encryption operation.

The power of this particular encryption technique is clear when theoriginal message is compared to the encrypted message which iscommunicated over the distributed network of computers.

-   -   Original Message: the red dog ran home 121    -   Transmitted Message: xbkunrevhcmguaeqveui 122        thereby providing encryption which is unique between the two        parties and making the transmission difficult if not impossible        to decrypt.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating the invention's protection forexecutable programs.

Processing unit 130 receives its operating programs, such as executableprograms, from the interface 131 which serves to decrypt the operatingprograms held in memory 132. The operating programs are placed withinoperating memory 133 by the processing unit and are withdrawn as needed.

In like fashion, when processing unit 130 shuts down, a check is made ofthe programs it has and a match is made to the memory unit, any programsnot in memory are communicated to operator 136 via monitor 134 andoperator 136 responds if these programs should be kept or “trashed”.Operator 136 responds via keyboard 135 or some other type of inputdevice such as a mouse or voice recognition microphone.

In this way, only the programs that the operator wants to keep areencrypted for later use while the improper or hacked programs arediscarded.

In this diagram, memory 132, interface 131, processing unit 130 andoperating memory 133 are shown as distinct boxes, but, in alternativeembodiments, these functional operations are contained within a singlehousing.

FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating the preferred embodiment for theverification of a proper key.

Once this program or subroutine starts 140A, the proposed key isobtained from the operator. Using the proposed key, the encryptedtemplate is decrypted 142. The proposed key is then verified 143. If theproposed key is verified (Yes), then the program/subroutine stops 140B;otherwise (the proposed key is not verified, a NO), the operator isinformed that the proposed key is not the valid key 144 and anotherproposed key is obtained 141.

In this manner, should the operator enter an improper key, a simplecheck reveals it as improper prior to any encryption being done. Also,since the proposed key is used to decrypt a template for comparison, andsince this template is encrypted, a hacker is unable to obtain access tothe key by getting into the unencrypted material within the computer;hence, a further level of security is added by this technique.

FIGS. 15A, 15B, and 15C illustrate alternatives for the verification ofkey input as first discussed relative to FIG. 14.

Referencing FIG. 15A, verification of the proposed key is accomplishedin this embodiment by first displaying the decrypted template to theoperator 150 and obtaining an authorization indicia from the operator151.

As example, the template may be as simple as the operator's name. Oncethe operator's name is decrypted, it is shown to the operator whoresponds with a “YES” or a “NO” depending on if the display shows hisname correctly.

This embodiment then branches 152A based upon the authorization response(element 143 of FIG. 14).

FIG. 15B shows another technique for verification in which the proposedkey is used to decrypt the template which is also the proper key.

As example, assume the proper key is: “September 7, 1952”; the properkey has previously been encrypted using itself for the encryptingprocess and the encrypted key is placed in the memory.

Later, when an operator enters a proposed key, the proposed key is usedto decrypt the encrypted proper key. Should the proposed key not becorrect, then the decryption will not be preformed properly and thedecrypted proper key will not match the proposed key.

This type of sorting is done through a simple logical function whichcompares the template (the proper key) with the proposed key; if theyare identical then encryption can proceed; if not, then, as outlined inFIG. 14 (element 143), the operator is informed and another proposed keyis obtained.

FIG. 15C illustrates yet another technique for ascertaining that theproposed key is proper prior to any encryption operation.

In this embodiment, the operator is queried as the substance of acomparison template 153. This comparison template is used to comparewith the decrypted template 154 for a verification operation.

One operation for this embodiment would be where the operator providesnot only a proposed key, but also the template. In this case, theoperator would provide a proposed key, Such as “my name is” and acomparison template, “Mark Ogram”. The program uses the proposed key “myname is” to decrypt the template within memory and if the decryptedtemplate doesn't match “Mark Ogram”, then the proposed key isn'tcorrect.

In all of these embodiments, a level of security is provided thatprevents any encryption of programs or data using an improper key.

FIG. 16 is a flowchart of the preferred embodiment of the interface usedto withdraw encrypted executable programs.

Once the program/subroutine starts 160A the identified program iswithdrawn from memory in its encrypted form 161A. The encrypted form isdecrypted 161B as outlined above and is sent to the processing unit 161C(which stores the decrypted program in the operating memory). Theprogram then stops 160B.

FIG. 17 is a flowchart of the preferred embodiment of the interface usedto store/encrypt executable programs.

At the start of the program/ subroutine 170A, the executable programwithin the operating memory is identified 171A. A comparison is thenmade to determine if that executable program has a counterpart withinthe encrypted programs 172A.

If there is a corresponding encrypted program (YES) then the executableprogram is removed from the operating memory 171E and a determination ismade on if there are any more executable programs within the operatingmemory to consider 172D. If there are no more executable programs toconsider the program stops 170B; otherwise, the next executable programwithin the operating memory is withdrawn 171 A for consideration.

Should there be no comparable encrypted program (172A, “NO”), then adetermination is made on if encryption key is needed 172B. If theencryption key has not been previously provided (YES) then the key isobtained from the operator 173 and the key is verified 171B as outlinedabove.

Once the key has been obtained, a determination is made on if theprogram should be stored 172C. This decision is accomplished typicallyby presenting the program to the operator to accept/reject; in otherembodiments, only selected programs can be added and these programs aredefined within the computer files.

If the decision is not to store the executable (“NO”) 172C, then theexecutable is removed and the program continues. If the decision is tostore the executable program (“YES”) 172C, then the program is encrypted171C using the key previously obtained and the encrypted program isstored 171D in memory and the executable program is removed 171E asoutlined above.

In this manner, any and all of the executable programs are scanned andonly the proper ones are stored in encrypted form.

Note, during an uncontrolled shut down of the computer (such as poweroutage), only the previously encrypted programs are kept.

Using the technique above, the present invention provides for a highlysecure structure for preventing unauthorized executable programs frombeing stored within a computer.

1. A computer system comprising: a) a memory; b) a processing unit beingconfigurable by executable commands; and, c) an interface configuredto, 1) withdraw an encrypted executable program from said memory, 2)decrypt said encrypted executable program into a functional executableprogram, and, 3) communicate said functional executable program to saidprocessing unit.
 2. The computer system according to claim 1, whereinsaid interface is further configured to: a) identify an executableprogram within said processing unit which does not have a encryptedcounterpart within said memory; b) query an operator of said computersystem if said executable program is to be saved and receive anauthorization response from said operator; and, c) based upon saidauthorization response, selectively, 1) encrypt said executable programinto an encrypted executable program, and, 2) store said encryptedexecutable program within said memory.
 3. The computer system accordingto claim 2, wherein, said interface is further configured to remove saidexecutable program from the memory and the processing unit.
 4. Thecomputer system according to claim 2, a) wherein said interface isfurther configured to accept a key from said operator; and, b) whereinsaid key is used when said interface operates to encrypt said executableprogram into an encrypted executable program.
 5. The computer systemaccording to claim 4, wherein said interface is further configured toverily said key as being, accurate.
 6. The computer system according toclaim 5, wherein, during operation of said interface to verify said keyas being accurate, said interface is further configured to: a) usingsaid key, decrypt an encrypted template from the memory into a decryptedtemplate; and, b) verify the decrypted template as being accurate. 7.The computer system according to claim 6, wherein, during operation ofsaid interface to verify the decrypted template as being accurate, saidinterface is configured to: a) present the decrypted template to theoperator of said computer; b) receive an acceptance response from theoperator of said computer; and, c) based upon said acceptance response,permit said interface to encrypt said executable program into anencrypted executable program.
 8. The computer system according to claim6, wherein, during operation of said interface to verify the decryptedtemplate as being accurate, said interface is configured to: a) comparesaid decrypted template to said key and generate a comparison indiciatherefrom; and, b) based upon said comparison indicia, permit saidinterface to encrypt said executable program into an encryptedexecutable program.
 9. The computer system according to claim 6,wherein, during operation of said interface to verify the decryptedtemplate as being accurate, said interface is configured to: a) comparesaid decrypted template to a predefined template and generate ancomparison indicia therefrom; and, b) based upon said comparisonindicia, permit said interface to encrypt said executable program intoan encrypted executable program.
 10. A loading system configured to: a)decrypt an encrypted executable program into a functional executableprogram; and, b) communicate said functional executable program to aprocessing unit.
 11. The loading system according to claim 10, furtherconfigured to: a) identify an executable program within said processingunit which does not have a encrypted counterpart; b) query an operatorif said executable program is to be saved; c) receive an authorizationresponse from said operator; and, d) based upon said authorizationresponse, encrypt said executable program into an encrypted executableprogram.
 12. The loading system according to claim 11, furtherconfigured to store said encrypted executable program within a memory.13. The computer system according to claim 11, wherein an operatordefined key is used when said interface operates to encrypt saidexecutable program into an encrypted executable program.
 14. Thecomputer system according to claim 13, wherein said interface is furtherconfigured to: a) using said operator defined key, decrypt an encryptedtemplate into a decrypted template; and, b) verify the decryptedtemplate as being accurate.
 15. A computer system comprising: a) amemory; b) a processing unit being configurable by executable commands;and, c) a loading interface configured to, 1) accept an operator definedkey, 2) withdraw an encrypted executable program from said memory, 2)using said operator defined key, decrypt said encrypted executableprogram into a functional executable program, and, 3) communicate saidfunctional executable program to said processing unit; and, d) whereinsaid processing unit operates said functional executable program. 16.The computer system according to claim 15, wherein said loadinginterface is further configured to: a) identify an executable programwithin said processing unit which does not have a encrypted counterpartwithin said memory; b) query an operator of said computer system if saidexecutable program is to be saved and receive an authorization responsefrom said operator; and, c) based upon said authorization response,selectively, 1) using said operator defined key, encrypt said executableprogram into a second encrypted executable program, and, 2) store thesecond encrypted executable program in said memory.
 17. The computersystem according to claim 16, wherein, said interface is furtherconfigured to, based on said authorization response, remove saidexecutable program from the memory and the processing unit.
 18. Thecomputer system according to claim 16, wherein said downloadinginterface is further configured: a) Using said key, decrypt an encryptedtemplate from memory into a decrypted template; b) present the decryptedtemplate to the operator of said computer; c) receive an acceptanceresponse from the operator of said computer; and, d) based upon saidacceptance response, permit said interface to encrypt said executableprogram into an encrypted executable program to verify said key as beingaccurate.